“Have an evil megacorp’s gaslighting robot invade your safe space instead!”

Relevant David Revoy cartoon: https://thebrainbin.org/m/comicstrips@lemmy.world/t/1848750/authenticity-problem

This is by David Revoy, who has started getting wrongly accused of using AI for his art

EHRC, not ECHR.

Plenty of shallow people in the world, sadly, enjoy vicariously living even shallower lives than their own.

IPMI/BMC have been known problems since 2015, if not before.

Matthew Garrett: IPMI - because ACPI and UEFI weren’t terrifying enough

Why is he wearing gloves, in this sculpture?

International coverage: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-accuses-russia-war-crime-after-video-shows-drone-hunting-market-vendor-2026-08-04/

I feel the same way, but can you explain how a VPN would help achieve that in the face of Google’s proposed developer verification scheme?

How would that help you?

The article says, “unverified apps will only be easily installable in the sanctioned countries where verification doesn’t exist.”

So even if you used a VPN to trick Google into thinking you live in a sanctioned country, you wouldn’t be able to distribute apps to those countries without breaking sanctions.

it’d be like saying we should disarm Ukraine, 'cause then Russia doesn’t have a reason to invade them

Putin’s All-Russia People’s Front’s policies toward Ukraine have many similarities to Netanyahu’s Likud party’s policies toward Gaza. Both sets of policies are tragic, causing many innocent people’s deaths.

Nevertheless, Ukraine and Gaza are different enough for one to reasonably reach different conclusions about how best peace can be achieved in each place:

• Ukraine’s weapons are protecting Ukraine against Russian attacks and invasion attempts. Therefore, it is in Ukraine’s interests to have them. Hamas’s weapons are not protecting Gaza against Israeli attacks or invasion. There is no obvious benefit from Hamas having them.
• Servant of the People, and Ukraine, do recognise Russia, and have not seriously proposed eliminating it. Hamas does not officially recognise Israel, and has seriously proposed eliminating it.
• Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, the USA, the EU, and the Organization of American States, all designate Hamas a terrorist organisation. This reduces the aid Gaza receives. They seem unlikely to reverse the designation unless Hamas disarms. None of them designate Servant of the People, or Ukraine, a terrorist organisation.

Those points lead me to believe Hamas should disarm.

I also believe countries giving aid to Israel should make it formally contingent on Israel withdrawing from Gaza and the West Bank, to pre-1967 borders, and recognising Palestinian statehood. However, it looks like the US is going to stop aid to Israel regardless.

Trust isn’t really the point. Everyone knows Israel and Hamas don’t trust each other. I’m more concerned with whether the violent conflict can be reduced, and a stable peace achieved.

Are Hamas’s arms doing Gaza any favours? Not that I can see.

AFAICT, if Hamas disarmed:

• Israel’s only(?) excuse for mass military action in Gaza would disappear.
• International support (already shaky) for Israeli military presence in Gaza would decrease.
• One or more of Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, or the European Union might end their designation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation, which could in turn increase the aid and other international support available to Gaza.

If you think I’m wrong, I’d be glad to know why.

Terrorism arises in defense to oppression.

Technical point: that isn’t exhaustively true. Terrorism can be, and sometimes is, committed against vulnerable parties by more privileged ones.

Progress report 1

• I’m ruling out HMAC-SHA1, because:
  • Plain vanilla HMAC-SHA1 uses a shared secret. I don’t want the PC to have a copy of the credential. It may also be susceptible to MITM/relay attacks.
  • Rolling-code HMAC-SHA1 only partially solves the problems of ordinary HMAC-SHA1.
  • Encrypted rolling code HMAC-SHA1 solves those problems, but I haven’t found a reliable source for using it with LUKS.
• If using systemd, pick FIDO2:
  • It avoids the flaws of HMAC-SHA1.
  • It’s supported natively in systemd so should be “future-proof”.
  • It’s a more widely-supported standard, than OpenPGP, with more HST vendors to choose from, including cheaper options than NitroKey or Yubikey. This could be useful in environments where each sysadmin (or colleague! or family member!) needs an HST.
  • It’s compatible with QubesOS.
• Otherwise, OpenPGP:
  • Like FIDO2, it solves the HMAC-SHA1 flaws.
  • However:
    • smartcard-key-luks seems to be unmainted both on GitHub and on GitLab.
    • Unlocking LUKS with OpenPGP isn’t well-documented for non-Debian-based distros.
• TBD: Clevis/Tang:
  • Permits remote/network-based unlocking.

ChromeOS uses a Linux kernel, so one could say desktop Linux usage is >12%.

A young 'un! Macintosh, surely.

their setup required a couple large antennas that the victim would need to stand in between. Not impossible, but you’d notice with each side being half a meter away.

So yes, it’s a technical risk, but not one that I’d bother putting much effort into avoiding. And the being able to use the key via NFC is probably worth the risk.

This was my conclusion, too, but I didn’t want to prejudice the discussion. Thanks for corroborating.

IMO, using a Faraday pouch isn’t “much effort”, and is therefore worth doing if the HST is being carried in unfamiliar/non-secure locations.

OS X (obsolete & unsupported since 2018) has more users than macOS?!

Even if you can [exploit NFC] at 1m, thats close enough that it can just be stolen from you.

Stealing the HST should not give the user a false sense of security. Not so dangerous.

Silently exfiltrating the private key (or data for a replay attack), OTOH, would leave the user with a false sense of security. Dangerous.

your link to rfidgate appears broken

Wfm. Here’s an archive link.

This coverage has a better headline: Trump blames Minnesota governor for cyberattacks against the state. Cites no evidence.

Funding restrictions and denialism, plus starting a war against a cyberattack-capable nation, made infrastructure attacks inevitable.

Security researchers have been publicly raising the alarm about SCADA vulnerabilities for 20+ years.